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collusion∗
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We study the impact of internal decision-making structures on the
stability of collusive agreements. To this end, we use a three-firm spatial
competition model where two firms belong to the same holding company.
The holding company can decide to set prices itself or to delegate this
decision to its local units. It is shown that when transportation costs are
high, collusion is more stable under delegation. Furthermore, collusion
with maximum prices is more profitable if price setting is delegated to
the local units. Profitability is reversed for low discount factors.
JEL classification: D43, L13, L41.
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1 Introduction
Antitrust and competition authorities have to evaluate the implications of a merger
for post-merger competition. To prevent coordinated effects in an industry, author-
ities have two types of remedies at their disposal: structural and non-structural
(behavioral) remedies. The former are often associated with (partial) divestiture
of assets owned by the acquiring firm. However, they may also involve a so-called
spin-off, where the shares of an acquired company are transferred to the stock-
holders of the acquiring firm and where the acquired firm is maintained as a sepa-
rate entity.1 Non-structural remedies may involve the delegation of decision-making
powers. For instance, as Campbell and Halladay (2002, p. 10) report, the Com-
missioner of Competition, who is the head of the Competition Bureau in Canada,
accepted the “maintenance of the acquired firm as a separate and distinct corporate
entity with a separate board of directors” in some decisions2 as a remedy to pre-
vent anti-competitive behavior. In this article, we are interested in the implications
for collusion when the (acquired) firms are kept as separate entities with certain
decision-making powers.
At first sight, the above logic behind such remedies seems compelling. Giving
decision-making powers away tends to have a similar effect as an increase in the
number of firms in the market which makes it harder to sustain collusive behavior.
However, this standard reasoning ignores how the centralization of decision powers
affects the other firms’ incentives to collude. We show that while it turns out to be
true that from the point of view of the holding company, its incentive to deviate
from a collusive agreement is increased if it delegates decision powers to local units,
the other firms in the market may be less likely to deviate if decisions are made
locally.
We use a three-firm spatial model a` la Salop (1979). In order to account for
different decision-making structures, there is a holding company which owns two
of the firms. The holding company decides whether to delegate the price setting
to its local units or not. As shown in various contributions in the literature on
mergers, the holding company indeed prefers to keep the pricing decision by itself in
the competitive case. This is easily understood by noting that when delegating the
price setting to the local units, there are three firms competing in the market instead
of two (which is the case when the holding company keeps authority). This implies
stronger competition, and thus lower prices and lower profits. So if discount factors
are low and collusion with maximum prices is not possible (although a weaker form
of collusion is still possible, see the third section), the holding company will set prices
itself. If, however, the discount factor is sufficiently high and collusion at maximum
prices is possible, the picture changes. We assume that the colluding parties bargain
over the collusive prices as in Harrington (1991) and Harrington et al. (2005). Then,
although the disagreement payoff (which is the competitive outcome) is better for
the holding company if it keeps decision powers, the overall outcome is better for
1This was the case in In re Procter & Gamble Co (see Shelanski and Sidak, 2001). As Timmins
(1986) points out, a spin-off may be required if there is no viable purchaser in the market in
the wake of a divestiture order by the court.
2This was the case in Canada Post/Purolator and Avis/Budget.
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the holding company if the local units negotiate (Proposition 1 ). Intuitively, this
can be understood by noting that in the latter case, the ‘collusive cake’ has to be
shared by three players, two of which belong to the holding company. In the former
case, there are two players trying to get their share of the cake.3
These results have consequences for the stability of collusion at maximum prices.
It is well known from the literature that collusion becomes less stable if there are
more parties to it. So one would expect that here also collusion will break down
more easily if the pricing is delegated to the local units as then three parties are
involved in the collusion. In line with intuition, Lemma 2 shows that the critical
discount factor, i.e. the discount factor where a party is just indifferent between
colluding and deviating, is smaller for the holding company for the case where it
keeps decision powers compared to the case where it delegates the pricing decision.
However, in order to determine whether collusion is sustainable in the market as
a whole, the outside firm’s incentive to deviate from collusion becomes relevant.
Indeed, as Lemma 3 shows, the critical discount factor of the outside firm is greater
than the one for the holding company. Proposition 2 shows that maximum prices
in the market are more likely to be sustained if the holding company delegates
decision-making powers and if transportation costs are high. For low transportation
costs, the result is reversed. Finally, Proposition 3 summarizes the results and
discusses the case for intermediate and/or low discount factors where, as shown by
Chang (1991), collusion does not break down completely but is still possible at lower
collusive prices.
There has been a growing interest in understanding how different internal firm
structures affect market outcomes. However, the literature focuses mainly on strate-
gic implications of divisionalization for competition and the resulting profits, as well
as on relative profits of insiders and outsiders in the context of mergers. What
has been neglected in the contributions so far is an analysis of the implications of
different decision-making regimes on the profitability and stability of collusive agree-
ments. Baye et al. (1996) assume divisionalization by one firm, which increases the
number of quantity-setting firms producing the same output in the industry. This
drives down industry profit but the multidivisional firm enjoys a greater share of
these profits. The authors show that the second effect is stronger which means that
divisionalization is profitable. Huck et al. (2004) develop a model where a joint
headquarter lets two divisions decide on output quantities. Additionally, it sets up
an internal sequential game in which the divisions compete against one another and
where there are internal information flows due to the sequential nature of the game.4
This implies that the market resembles a Stackelberg, rather than a Cournot, mar-
ket. As a result, mergers may be profitable and welfare-improving even if the linear
cost function is the same for all firms. At the same time, competitors are worse off
3This result resembles the classical case of quantity competition with three firms where the two
merging firms usually lose out as they have the highest incentive to reduce quantity after the
merger (so-called merger paradox). So a holding company prefers to merge but would rather
leave decision powers with the local units. In our case, the holding company is weaker with
respect to negotiating good conditions for itself as its marginal profits count less compared to
a situation where the two local units bargain instead.
4The authors show that this sequential structure also arises endogenously when the divisions may
make their own timing decisions.
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as their profits decrease. In a similar setup, Creane and Davidson (2004) come to
the same conclusion.
The article by Levy and Reitzes (1992) is related to the present one in that it
analyzes the implications of mergers for the stability of collusion. Unlike the present
article, they look at the conditions under which firms actually find it profitable to
merge. Contrary to the analysis in this article, firms are assumed to maximize
industry profits in a collusive phase which means that firms’ asymmetry is not
accounted for. As a consequence, the profitability of a merger, once collusion can be
achieved, is not an issue. In addition, a comparison between the deviating incentives
of the merged firm and of the other firms in the market is not made.
The articles by Lambertini and Trombetta (2002) and Spagnolo (2005) are re-
lated to the present one with respect to the delegation of decision powers and its
implications for collusion. Contrary to these contributions, we do not compare the
effects of different (publicly observable) contract schemes for the stability of col-
lusion, but consider different decision-making scenarios.5 When it comes to the
internal decision-making structure actually preferred by the merging firms, Prechel
et al. (1999) show in an empirical study that these firms tend to opt for decentralized
decision making.
The article proceeds as follows. In the following section, we set up the model
and look at the competitive case before we analyze collusion and the incentives to
deviate. In the third section, we derive the critical discount factors and compare
the outcomes as well as the profitability for the two decision-making regimes. The
last section concludes.
2 The model
We want to capture the trade-off a holding company faces when having to decide
about delegating decision-making powers under market collusion. To this end, we
follow the well known Salop (1979) setup for a market of spatial competition with
horizontal product differentiation. There are three firms with two firms (firms 2 and
3) being governed by a holding company. All three firms are located equidistantly
from each other along a circular city with a circumference of 1. In order to capture
different internal decision-making structures, the holding company may either keep
the pricing decision or give it away to both of its local units.6
We model collusive behavior following Friedman (1971) (so-called grim-trigger
strategies): Firms tacitly agree to collude. So in every period the holding company
and the third firm set collusive prices whenever no one deviated from the agreement
in the previous period. If there is deviation, this triggers a price war and there is
competition forever. A problem with the modeling by Friedman (1971) and with
most models on collusive outcomes is that there are many prices which can be
sustained in equilibrium. Usually the literature concentrates on those prices which
5Relatedly, Olaizola (2007) studies the effects of delegation on endogenous cartel formation among
symmetric firms.
6Note that one may also think of a situation where the pricing decision is partially delegated only.
This could be done by having local units take into account the other unit’s (weighted) profits
as well.
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maximize the overall collusive profit. This procedure might be considered reasonable
as long as firms are symmetric. Here, however, the outside firm and the holding
company differ. Therefore, we follow Harrington (1991) and Harrington et al. (2005)
and assume that at an initial stage, the price-setting parties (implicitly) bargain over
the collusive prices.
As is common for the analysis of collusion, we will later make use of the so-called
critical discount factor in order to define the range of discount factors for which
maximum collusive prices are sustainable. The critical discount factor according to
Friedman (1971) is characterized as follows:7
δ ≥ δ¯ := pi
D − piC
piD − piN (1)
where superscripts C, D, and N denote profits in the collusive, the deviating, and
the punishment (competitive Nash price equilibrium) cases, respectively.8
In what follows, we will derive the profits for all three situations. We start with
the punishment case as the profits under price competition will be needed to derive
the optimal collusive prices.9
2.1 Punishment through competition
Customers of mass 1 are uniformly distributed along the unit circle and are interested
in buying one product or none. They are assumed to derive a basic utility of 1 from
purchasing the product offered by firm i (i ∈ {1, 2, 3}). Furthermore, a customer
located at some distance ∆i from firm i has to incur (quadratic) transportation costs
of τ∆2i when traveling to this firm. pi denotes the price charged by firm i. Hence, a
customer derives the following net utility ui when buying from this firm:
ui = 1− pi − τ∆2i . (2)
We make the following assumption with respect to the transportation costs:
Assumption 1 0 < τ ≤ 7/2 =: τ¯ .
This assumption ensures that it is optimal for the market to be covered.10
7The critical discount factor can be derived from the requirement that profits from the collusive
agreement must be higher than those from deviation and the ensuing punishment phase, i.e.
piC/(1− δ) ≥ piD + δpiN/(1− δ).
8An alternative option would be the use of optimal punishments due to Abreu (1986, 1988)
and Abreu et al. (1986) (so-called stick-and-carrot strategies). As Ha¨ckner (1996) shows, ap-
plying optimal punishments in the context of a setup a` la Hotelling (1929) with quadratic
transportation costs and symmetric firms gives qualitatively the same results with respect
to the impact of product differentiation on the collusive price as in Chang (1991) who uses
grim-trigger strategies. Therefore, we conjecture that our results would hold qualitatively for
optimal punishments. In the present context with asymmetric firms, the derivation of such
optimal punishments becomes non-tractable.
9The following section is a special case of the analysis in Posada and Straume (2004) who analyze
firms’ incentives to merge under partial merger and relocation.
10This result is derived in the appendix as part of the derivation of the collusive prices.
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Centralized decision making
We start by considering the case where the holding company makes the pricing
decision. Denote by xi the position of the marginal customer located in between
firm i and the next firm in the clockwise direction (where subscript c stands for
centralization). Then, the indifferent customer between firms 1 (price pN1,c) and 2
(price pNh,c where subscript h stands for the holding company) can be obtained by
solving
pN1,c + τx
2
1 = p
N
h,c + τ
(
1
3
− x1
)2
(3)
for xN1,c which gives
xN1,c =
1
6
− 3
(
pN1,c − pNh,c
)
2τ
.
Hence, from the profits for firm 1 and the holding company, i.e.
piN1,c = 2p
N
1,c
(
1
6
− 3
(
pN1,c − pNh,c
)
2τ
)
(4)
and
piNh,c = 2p
N
h,c
(
1
3
+
3
(
pN1,c − pNh,c
)
2τ
)
, (5)
we can derive the optimal prices in the usual way. We then find the following
equilibrium prices and profits:
pN1,c =
4τ
27
, (6)
pNh,c =
5τ
27
, (7)
piN1,c =
16τ
243
, (8)
and
piNh,c =
25τ
243
. (9)
Note that given these prices, the basic utility is large enough so that every customer
between two firms has indeed an incentive to join one of these firms, i.e. the market
is covered.
We now turn to the case where the holding company gives away the pricing
decision.
Decentralized decision making
Decentralized decision making is characterized by a situation where the two local
units are in charge of price setting (subscript d). As a result, the punishment involves
price competition between all three firms. We assume that the managers of the local
units maximize the profits of their individual unit.
6
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Proceeding in the same way as before gives
pNi,d =
τ
9
, (10)
piNi,d =
τ
27
, (11)
and
piNh,d = 2pi
N
i,d =
2τ
27
. (12)
Note that the market is covered here as well.
To summarize we restate a familiar result that under competition the holding
company will set higher prices. By setting prices itself, the holding company can
avoid competing with itself for the customers located in between its two local units.
As prices are strategic complements it follows immediately that firm 1 will charge a
higher price if the holding company sets the prices for its units. These higher prices
then translate into higher profits for the holding company as well as for firm 1.
We now proceed with analyzing the different scenarios under collusion.
2.2 Collusive outcome
In this section it is assumed that collusion is feasible. The incentives to defect from
collusion are analyzed in the next subsection. Again, we have to distinguish between
the two cases of internal decision making.
Centralized decision making
We start with the situation where all decisions are made by the holding company.
Like Harrington (1991) and Harrington et al. (2005), we assume that under collusion
prices will be set according to the Nash bargaining solution11, i.e. the maximization
problem can be written as follows:
max
pC1,c,p
C
h,c
ΠCc :=
(
piC1,c − piN1,c
) (
piCh,c − piNh,c
)
(13)
where piC1,c and pi
C
h,c are calculated by replacing p
N
1,c and p
N
h,c in equations (4) and (5)
by pC1,c and p
C
h,c, respectively. In the appendix, we provide a formal proof for the
derivation of the optimal collusive prices. It is shown that the holding company
will set its collusive price at the highest possible level such that the market is still
covered. This means that the customer halfway between the holding company’s
local units will be left with zero utility, i.e. pCh,c = 1− τ/36. At the same time, the
outside firm charges a lower collusive price. This is due to the fact that starting
from pC1,c = p
C
h,c, pi
C
1,c − piN1,c is lower than piCh,c − piNh,c. Thus, a small increase in piC1,c
(through a decrease of pC1,c) with a corresponding small reduction in pi
C
h,c increases
the product.
11This solution was proposed by Nash (1950) (see also Osborne and Rubinstein, 1990, chapter 2).
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Decentralized decision making
Next, we are interested in the collusive prices if the holding company does not set
the prices for its two local units. We assume that collusion is only feasible if all three
firms participate, i.e. there is a grand coalition. The optimal outcome is therefore
the solution to the following maximization problem:
max
pC
i,d
ΠCd :=
(
piC1,d − piN1,d
) (
piC2,d − piN2,d
) (
piC3,d − piN3,d
)
=
(
piCi,d − piNi,d
)3
. (14)
Due to the symmetric structure, the optimal collusive price is the same for all firms
and is such that the indifferent customer in between any two firms is left with a
utility of zero:
pCi,d = 1−
τ
36
. (15)
Profits thus amount to
piCi,d =
1
3
− τ
108
(16)
and
piCh,d = 2pi
C
i,d =
2
3
− τ
54
. (17)
We summarize our findings from this subsection in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Comparing both decision-making regimes under collusion yields:
(a) pC1,c < p
C
h,c,
(b) pCh,c = p
C
i,d,
(c) piC1,c > pi
C
1,d, and
(d) piCh,c < pi
C
h,d.
Proof Ad (a) and (b): Follow from the derivation of the maximum collusive prices
which is relegated to the appendix. Ad (c) and (d): Follow from (a) and (b). 
If pricing decisions are delegated to the local units, all three firms charge the
monopoly price of 1 − τ/36 and share the market equally (result (b)). If, how-
ever, the holding company keeps authority over prices, then it will be worse off.
While its units still charge 1− τ/36 (result (b)), firm 1 charges a lower price (result
(a)), leaving less profit to the holding company. This result is not straightforward
from the point of view of the holding company: The analysis of the competitive case
showed that in the case of breakdown of collusion, a holding company fares better by
keeping decision powers. This effect of a more favorable disagreement payoff leads to
an increase in bargaining power which tends to lead to a higher collusive profit. On
the other hand, as the parties bargain over the collusive prices, the holding company
fares worse in bilateral negotiations. This is intuitively clear as by direct negotia-
tions, the ‘collusive cake’, i.e. the profits generated by collusion, has to be divided
among two players. If, however, the two local units negotiate for themselves, this
8
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cake is divided among three firms two of which are owned by the holding company.12
More formally, in equilibrium the profits of the holding company’s local units enter
the maximization problem additively in the former case (see equation (13)) while in
the latter case, they enter quadratically (see equation (14)). A marginal increase in
profits increases this expression more if profits enter quadratically.
The following observation will be relevant below: ∂(piC1,c − piC1,d)/∂τ < 0, i.e. an
increase in the transportation costs reduces the difference in the outside firm’s col-
lusive profits under both regimes. This can be explained by pointing out that the
outside firm captures a market share of more than 1/3 by charging a lower price
than the holding company. However, as transportation costs increase, customers
incur a higher disutility which means that this price would have to be lowered to
a (much) larger extent—compared to the actual price—in order to reach the same
market share. As a consequence, the outside firm’s market share is reduced which
leads to (relatively) lower profits since in the case of decentralization, there is only
a price-reducing effect whenever transportation costs are increased.
Having determined the collusive prices, we next turn to the deviation incentives
firms have.
2.3 One-period deviation incentives
We start with the simpler case where firm i faces two rivals which charge a collusive
price of 1−τ/36. Then, a deviating firm may either seize only a share of the market
by setting a moderate deviation price or it may cover the whole market through a
very low price. Now consider the first situation: Determining firm i’s deviation profit
in the usual way, differentiating with respect to the deviation price, and solving for
the optimal price for firm i gives
pD1,c = p
D
i,d =
1
2
+
τ
24
. (18)
In this case, the deviating firm’s market share amounts to
xD1,c = x
D
i,d =
12 + τ
16τ
. (19)
Hence, the deviating firm covers the whole market whenever xD1,c = x
D
i,d ≥ 1/2 ⇔
τ ≤ 12/7 =: τˆ , i.e. when transportation costs are low. As the deviating firm cannot
extend its market share further than that, it will charge a deviation price of
1
6
− 3p
D
1,c − 3
(
1− τ
36
)
2τ
=
1
2
⇔ pD1,c = pDi,d = 1−
τ
4
. (20)
12One may argue that such a distribution of profits in the present scenario is due to the fact that
all parties have the same bargaining power. Indeed, giving the holding company (sufficiently)
more bargaining power when ‘negotiating’ with the outside firm would result in equal profits
for all three (local) firms. However, we think that our specification is suitable insofar as factors
that usually lead to different degrees of bargaining power like impatience, risk of breakdown,
(legally binding) commitment tactics, etc. (see Muthoo, 1999) are not relevant here.
9
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We thus have the following outcome:
pD1,c = p
D
i,d =
{
1− τ
4
if τ ≤ τˆ
1
2
+ τ
24
else
(21)
and
piD1,c = pi
D
i,d =
{
1− τ
4
if τ ≤ τˆ
(12+τ)2
192τ
else.
(22)
Performing the same analysis for the holding company’s deviating incentives under
centralized decision making leads to the following lemma:13
Lemma 1 One-period deviation incentives imply that pD1,c = p
D
i,d < p
D
h,c.
Proof See the appendix. 
If the holding company keeps pricing power and deviates, it will charge a higher
price compared to the case where local units set prices and deviate. At first glance,
this may not seem obvious as the collusive price by firm 1 is lower in the case without
the delegation of the pricing decision, so one would expect the best reply to that
price to be a lower price too. Whenever a firm deviates, however, it has to find
an optimal balance between a reduction in price and an increase in market share.
Therefore, a holding company charges a higher deviation price as a price cut applies
to a greater market share.14
Given the results from the analysis so far, it is now possible to calculate the critical
discount factors in order to compare the sustainability and profitability of collusive
agreements under different decision-making rules.
3 Sustainability of maximum prices under
collusion
In order to analyze the overall incentives to deviate from the maximum collusive
prices, we calculate the respective critical discount factors. They define the range
for which the maximum collusive prices can be sustained: The higher the discount
factor, the smaller this range. First, we analyze how the internal decision-making
process affects the deviation incentives for the holding company and its two local
units. Let δ¯h,c := (pi
D
h,c − piCh,c)/(piDh,c − piNh,c) and δ¯i,d := (piDi,d − piCi,d)/(piDi,d − piNi,d). We
obtain:
Lemma 2 On the holding-company level, δ¯h,c < δ¯i,d holds.
Proof See the appendix. 
13Note that the holding company wants to serve the whole market for any τ ≤ τˇ where τˇ ≈ 2.01244.
14Moreover, if the holding company seeks to cover the whole market, the customer that is furthest
away from each of the local units is located at a distance of only 1/3.
10
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On the holding-company level, collusion is more stable under a centralized decision-
making structure. Giving away the pricing decision to the local units will make
deviation from the collusive agreement more likely when considering maximum col-
lusive prices. The reason for this outcome is similar to the classic argument of why
collusion becomes less stable if there are more parties to it.15 Deviating is much
more attractive for a local unit as it also steals customers from the other local unit
and not just from firm 1. In addition, firm 1 charges a higher price for the case where
pricing power is with the local units which makes deviation even more profitable. So
although future punishment is harder, i.e. the competitive profits in future periods
are lower if pricing rests with the local units, the first two effects outweigh the latter
to give the result of Lemma 2.
Next, we look at the outside firm and the holding company. Let δ¯1,c := (pi
D
1,c −
piC1,c)/(pi
D
1,c − piN1,c). Then, we can state the following result:
Lemma 3 For the case where the holding company sets prices, it holds that δ¯1,c >
δ¯h,c.
Proof See the appendix. 
The outside firm is more likely to deviate whenever the holding company does not
delegate the pricing decision. Note that the holding company charges the higher
collusive price. Hence, deviating is quite attractive for the outside firm as it is able
to capture a large share of the market (or all of it, for that matter).
From a market point of view, we have to find the weakest link for the collusion
with maximum prices, i.e. the firm with the largest critical discount factor, to
determine whether collusion is possible or not. Lemma 3 and the fact that the
deviation incentives are the same for all firms under decentralization imply that it
is indeed the outside firm’s behavior which is crucial for the stability of a collusive
agreement from the perspective of the market as a whole. This is stated in the next
proposition:
Proposition 2 There exists a τ˜ < τ¯ such that δ¯1,c ⋚ δ¯1,d ⇔ τ ⋚ τ˜ , i.e. for low
(high) transportation costs, the critical discount factor for the outside firm in a
market with centralized decision making is smaller (greater) than under decentral-
ization.
Proof See the appendix. 
Proposition 2 shows that maximum collusive prices can be sustained for a broader
range of discount factors if the holding company gives away (does not give away)
the pricing decision and if the transportation costs are high (low).16 The intuition
behind the above result is as follows: Both under centralized and decentralized
decision making, the outside firm has the same deviation incentives, so it is sufficient
to focus on its competitive and collusive profits. With respect to these profits,
there are two effects which work in opposite directions: On the one hand, due to
the bargaining process under centralization, the outside firm generates a higher
15See, e.g., Majerus (1988).
16Note that τ˜ ≈ 3.04168.
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Table 1: Comparison of the critical discount factors
τ < τ˜ τ > τ˜
δ¯h,c < δ¯1,c < δ¯i,d δ¯h,c < δ¯i,d < δ¯1,c
collusive profit which stabilizes collusion. On the other hand, however, it faces a
less severe punishment. For low values of the transportation costs, the latter effect
is negligible as competitive profits for the outside firm are rather low both under
centralization as well as decentralization. At the same time, the difference between
the outside firm’s collusive profit under both regimes is rather large (see remarks
on Proposition 1 ).17 As a result, the outside firm is more likely to deviate under
delegation, thus destabilizing collusion under a decentralized decision-making regime
to a larger extent. The strength of these effects is reversed if transportation costs
are high as the difference with respect to the competitive profits increases with
the transportation costs. As a consequence, the centralization of decision-making
powers leads to a destabilization of the collusive agreement. This is not necessarily
what one expects as usually a lower number of firms in the market means that
collusion can be sustained more easily. Here, however, the less severe punishment
under centralized decision making turns this result around.
Table 1 compares all three critical discount factors for different values of the
transportation cost parameter.
Next, we turn to the case where the industry’s discount factor is below the critical
discount factor and analyze the implications for the collusive prices.
Collusion for discount factors below the critical ones
As shown in Chang (1991), a lower discount factor than the critical one does not
necessarily mean that collusion is not sustainable in a situation where firms are
horizontally differentiated. Firms may not be able to charge their maximum collusive
prices but prices higher than the competitive prices can still be supported as a
collusive outcome as long as the discount factor is strictly positive. In order to
understand the basic mechanism, consider the case of decentralized decision-making
powers. Now take the case where τ > τˆ , i.e. a deviating firm does not want
to capture the whole market. Clearly, if the collusive price has to be adjusted
downwards, the incentive to seize all of the market is further reduced. Therefore,
collusion will be stable as long as
pCi,d
3(1− δ) ≥
(
9pCi,d + τ
)2
108τ
+
δpiNi,d
1− δ ⇔ p
C
i,d(δ) ≤
τ(1 + 3δ)
9(1− δ) (23)
holds.18
Hence, one arrives at a δ-adjusted collusive price which is strictly increasing in the
17E.g., for τ → 0, we get piN
1,c → 0 and piNi,d → 0 whereas collusive profits are strictly positive and
piC
1,c > pi
C
i,d.
18See the proof of Proposition 3 in the appendix for an analysis of the case where τ ≤ τˆ .
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discount factor. If the discount factor converges to 0, then the price converges to the
competitive price. We will not derive the explicit collusive prices for the scenario
with centralized price setting as computations are not tractable.
From the competitive case, we know that centralizing the price-setting decision
is more profitable, i.e. piNh,c > pi
N
h,d. Proposition 1 states that when comparing
maximum collusive profits, delegating price-setting power is more profitable for the
holding company, i.e. piCh,c < pi
C
h,d. Combining these results with the general insights
from the approach by Chang (1991), we can state the following proposition:
Proposition 3 For any τ ∈ (0, τ¯ ], there exist δ∗ and δ∗∗ with 0 < δ∗ ≤ δ∗∗ ≤ δ¯i,d
such that if δ ≤ δ∗ ⇒ piCh,c ≥ piCh,d and if δ ≥ δ∗∗ ⇒ piCh,c ≤ piCh,d.
Proof See the appendix. 
Hence, the profitability of collusion depends on the centralization of the price-setting
decision. Whereas centralization makes sense for lower discount factors, high dis-
count factors suggest the decentralization of internal decision responsibilities. For
two values of the transportation costs (τ relatively small and τ large), we derived
the respective collusive profits under centralization numerically to compare both
regimes. The results are given in Figures 1 and 2.
δ
piC
h,d
piC
h,c
0 1
0.68055
0.06945
Figure 1: Comparison of collusive profits under both regimes (for τ = 3/2)
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δ
piC
h,d
piC
h,c
0 1
0.62889
0.23222
Figure 2: Comparison of collusive profits under both regimes (for τ = τ¯ = 7/2)
4 Conclusions
In this article, we analyze how different internal decision-making structures affect
the stability of collusive agreements. Our findings can be summarized as follows.
Making use of a three-firm spatial model a` la Salop (1979), we find that on the
holding-company level, (a) the maximum profit from collusion is higher if the holding
company delegates the pricing decision and (b) if it does so, the incentives for its local
units to deviate from the collusive agreement are increased. From the perspective
of the market as a whole, however, we find that (c) the critical discount factor is
determined by the outside firm: It is higher (lower) in the centralized decision-
making regime if transportation costs are high (low).
Summing up, antitrust and competition authorities trying to prevent coordinated
effects should be careful when imposing certain restrictions with respect to the
decision-making structure on merging firms. While the “maintenance of the acquired
firm as a separate and distinct corporate entity with a separate board of directors”
(see the introduction) might restrain the merged firm in some of its detrimental
economic behavior, it might, however, enable the market as a whole to collude.
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Appendix
Derivation of maximum collusive prices under centralization
Proof We divide the proof into two parts where we (a) derive the maximum collu-
sive prices assuming full market coverage and (b) show that partial market coverage
cannot be optimal.
Ad (a): As explained above, the maximization problem concerning collusive prices
under full market coverage amounts to maxpC1,c,pCh,cΠ
C
c := (pi
C
1,c−piN1,c)(piCh,c−piNh,c). Note
first that if both collusive prices are below 1 − τ/36, then increasing these prices
simultaneously by the same amount such that the market shares are not changed
leads to an increase in the product. There are two cases: The price charged by the
outside firm may either be (i) higher or (ii) smaller than the one charged by the
holding company.
Ad (i): As argued above, this case implies that pC1,c ≥ 1 − τ/36 must hold. At
the same time, pCh,c < 1− τ/36 must be true in order for the market to be covered.
However, pCh,c cannot be too small as the outside firm needs to have an incentive
to participate. More precisely, it must hold that piC1,c − piN1,c ≥ 0 ⇔ pCh,c ≥ pC1,c +
16τ 2/(729pC1,c) − τ/9. Note that this expression attains a minimum when pC1,c is
equal to the competitive price pN1,c. This implies that p
C
h,c ≥ pNh,c.
Next, we get
∂ΠCc
∂pC1,c
=
pC1,c(−19683pC1,cpCh,c + 26244pCh,c2 − 1458pCh,cτ + 450τ 2)
729τ 2
− 9p
C
h,c
3
τ 2
+
pCh,c
2
τ
− 23p
C
h,c
81
− 25τ
729
. (24)
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Solving ∂ΠCc /∂p
C
1,c = 0 for p
C
1,c gives the following two solutions:
pC1,c
′
=
2pCh,c
3
+
25τ 2 −
√
531441pCh,c
4 − 59049pCh,c3τ + 29160pCh,c2τ 2
2187pCh,c
− τ
27
(25)
as well as
pC1,c
′′
=
2pCh,c
3
+
25τ 2 +
√
531441pCh,c
4 − 59049pCh,c3τ + 29160pCh,c2τ 2
2187pCh,c
− τ
27
. (26)
From the second-order condition given by
∂2ΠCc
∂pC1,c
2 = −
2
(
2187pC1,cp
C
h,c − 1458pCh,c2 + 81pCh,cτ − 25τ 2
)
81τ 2
, (27)
we observe that
∂2ΠCc
∂pC1,c
2

pC1,c=p
C
1,c
′
=
2
√
531441pCh,c
4 − 59049pCh,c3τ + 29160pCh,c2τ 2 − 10125pCh,cτ 3 + 625τ 4
81τ 2
> 0. (28)
In a similar way, one can show that the second-order condition is strictly smaller
than 0 for pC1,c
′′
. For pC1,c
′′
to be part of the equilibrium defined above, it must hold
that pC1,c
′′ ≥ 1 − τ/36. However, for any pCh,c ∈ [pNh,c, 1 − τ/36) ⇒ pC1,c′′ < 1 − τ/36.
Thus, pC1,c > p
C
h,c cannot be the solution.
Ad (ii): From (i) and the argument put forward above, we know that pC1,c < p
C
h,c =
1−τ/36 must hold. Now let A := 136048896−30233088+9354528τ 2−3053376τ 3+
238165τ 4.19 Then, plugging pCh,c = 1− τ/36 into pC1,c′′ gives the optimal price for the
outside firm:
pC1,c =
23328− 2592τ + 454τ 2 +√A
972(36− τ) . (29)
Thus, profits are given by
piC1,c =
(
23328− 2592τ + 454τ 2 +√A
)(
11664 + 4536τ − 535τ 2 −√A
)
314928τ(36− τ)2 (30)
and
piCh,c = pi
C
2,c + pi
C
3,c =
−11664 + 7128τ + 211τ 2 +√A
11664τ
. (31)
Ad (b): When it comes to partial market coverage, there are three cases which
are relevant: (i) no full coverage between any two firms, (ii) no coverage between
the outside firm and the local units, and (iii) no coverage between the local units.
19Note that A ≥ 0 ∀τ ∈ (0, τ¯ ].
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Ad (i): Note first that in this case, we must have pCh,c > 1 − τ/36 so that the
market between the two local units is not covered. If the market is not covered
between any two of the three firms, the maximization problem boils down to
max
pC1,c,p
C
h,c
ΠCc
′
:=

2pC1,c
√
1− pC1,c
τ
− piN1,c



4pCh,c
√
1− pCh,c
τ
− piNh,c

 . (32)
Hence, one gets
∂ΠCc
′
∂pCh,c
=

2pC1,c
√
1− pC1,c
τ
− piN1,c



− 3pCh,c − 2√
τ
(
1− pCh,c
)

 . (33)
Note that ∂ΠCc
′
/∂pCh,c > 0 only holds if p
C
h,c < 2/3 which contradicts the condition
that pCh,c > 1− τ/36 must hold.
Ad (ii): This case requires pCh,c ≤ 1−τ/36 to hold which implies that pC1,c > 1−τ/36
must be true in order to make sure that the market between the outside firm and
one of the two local units will indeed not be covered. The maximization problem
can be written as
max
pC1,c,p
C
h,c
ΠCc
′′
:=
(
2pC1,c
(
1− pC1,c
)
τ
− piN1,c
)2pCh,c

1
6
+
√
1− pCh,c
τ

− piNh,c

 . (34)
Thus, we get
∂ΠCc
′′
∂pC1,c
=

− 3pC1,c − 2√
τ
(
1− pC1,c
)



2pCh,c

1
6
+
√
1− pCh,c
τ

− piNh,c

 . (35)
Again, ∂ΠCc
′′
/∂pC1,c > 0 is only true if p
C
1,c < 2/3 which is not compatible with the
condition that pC1,c > 1− τ/36 must hold.
Ad (iii): Note that we must have pCh,c > 1−τ/36 which implies that pC1,c < 1−τ/36
must hold. We then face the following maximization problem:
max
pC1,c,p
C
h,c
ΠCc
′′′
:=
(
2pC1,c
(
1
6
− 3
(
pC1,c − pCh,c
)
2τ
)
− piN1,c
)
×

2pCh,c


√
1− pCh,c
τ
+
1
6
+
3
(
pC1,c − pCh,c
)
2τ

− piNh,c

 . (36)
We start by differentiating with respect to pC1,c and find that both ∂Π
C
c
′′′
/∂pC1,c = 0
and ∂2ΠCc
′′′
/∂pC1,c
2
< 0 hold for some solution denoted pC1,c
∗
. Next, we check whether
an improvement is possible for any pCh,c > 1−τ/36. To this end, solve ΠCc ′′′

pC1,c=p
C
1,c
∗>
ΠCc

pC1,c=
23328−2592τ+454τ2+
√
A
972(36−τ) ,p
C
h,c
=1− τ
36
for pCh,c. We find that for any τ ≤ τ¯ , there is no
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solution to the problem which satisfies pCh,c > 1− τ/36. 
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof Note first that for τ = τ¯ , it is true that pD1,c < p
D
h,c. Next, consider τ < τ¯ : We
look for a solution to pD1,c = p
D
h,c with respect to τ in the three relevant regions defined
by the deviation prices, i.e. (a) τ ∈ (0, τˆ ], (b) τ ∈ (τˆ , τˇ ], and (c) τ ∈ (τˇ , τ¯ ]. In all
three cases (a)–(c), solving pD1,c = p
D
h,c for τ does not give a (real-number) solution
at all. As the deviation prices are continuous, we can conclude that pD1,c < p
D
h,c must
hold for any τ ∈ (0, τ¯ ]. 
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof For τ = τ¯ , it holds that δ¯h,c < δ¯i,d. Now consider τ < τ¯ : We check whether a
solution to δ¯h,c = δ¯i,d with respect to τ exists in the three relevant regions defined by
the deviation prices (see proof of Lemma 1 ). In case (a), we find that δ¯h,c = δ¯i,d only
holds if τ ≈ 2.76923 or τ ≈ 4.43725 which contradicts the condition that τ ∈ (0, τˆ ].
Proceeding with case (b), one gets δ¯h,c = δ¯i,d ⇔ τ ≈ 9.66200 which conflicts with
the condition that τ ∈ (τˆ , τˇ ]. Finally, in case (c), we find that δ¯h,c = δ¯i,d is true only
if τ ≈ −5.08691 which contradicts the condition that τ ∈ (τˇ , τ¯ ]. As the discount
factors are continuous, we know that δ¯h,c < δ¯i,d must hold for any τ ∈ (0, τ¯ ]. 
Proof of Lemma 3
Proof We find that if τ = τ¯ , then δ¯1,c > δ¯h,c. Turning to τ < τ¯ , we need to look
for a solution to δ¯1,c = δ¯h,c with respect to τ in the three relevant regions (see proof
of Lemma 1 ). For case (a), one gets δ¯1,c = δ¯h,c for τ ≈ 2.54409 which conflicts
with the condition that τ ∈ (0, τˆ ]. In case (b), we find that δ¯1,c = δ¯h,c is true only
if τ ≈ −7.75837 or τ ≈ 9.84511 which contradicts the condition that τ ∈ (τˆ , τˇ ].
Finally, in case (c), solving δ¯1,c = δ¯h,c for τ does not give any solution. Since the
discount factors are continuous, we can conclude that δ¯1,c > δ¯h,c must hold for any
τ ∈ (0, τ¯ ]. 
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof For τ = τ¯ , δ¯1,c > δ¯i,d is true. Proceeding with the analysis of the situation
where τ < τ¯ , we look for a solution to δ¯1,c = δ¯i,d with respect to τ in the two
relevant regions defined by the deviation prices, i.e. (a) τ ∈ (0, τˆ ] and (b) τ ∈ (τˆ , τ¯ ].
In case (a), we find that δ¯1,c = δ¯i,d only holds if τ ≈ −24.77747 which contradicts
the condition that τ ∈ (0, τˆ ]. Turning to case (b), we find that δ¯1,c = δ¯i,d is true for
τ ≈ 3.04168. As the discount factors are continuous, the proposition follows. 
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof The proof is divided into two parts: We (a) complete the analysis for the
situation with decentralization and (b) analyze the centralization case.
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Ad (a): Consider the decentralization case where τ ≤ τˆ . If the collusive price has
to be adjusted downwards, a deviating firm may no longer try to seize all of the
market. If it still does, it will set a deviation price of 1/6−3(pDi,d−pCi,d)/2τ = 1/2⇔
pDi,d = p
C
i,d − 2τ/9. Given this deviation price, the following condition must hold for
collusion to be sustainable: pCi,d/3(1 − δ) ≥ pCi,d − 2τ/9 + δpiNi,d/(1 − δ) ⇔ pCi,d(δ) ≤
τ(6− 7δ)/9(2− 3δ).
Next, we need to check whether serving the whole market is optimal for any value
of δ. For a given pCi,d, covering the whole market is indeed (weakly) optimal as long as
pCi,d−2τ/9 ≥ (9pCi,d+τ)2/108τ ⇔ pCi,d ≥ 5τ/9. Thus, setting pCi,d = τ(6−7δ)/9(2−3δ)
and solving the inequality for δ reveals that τ(6− 7δ)/9(2− 3δ) ≥ 5τ/9⇔ δ ≥ 1/2.
Hence, we can characterize the adjusted collusive prices under decentralization
for any δ ≤ δ¯i,d as follows:20
pCi,d(δ) =
{
τ(6−7δ)
9(2−3δ)
if τ ≤ τˆ ∧ δ ≥ 1
2
τ(1+3δ)
9(1−δ)
else.
(37)
Ad (b): We prove that a solution to the maximization problem exists.21 The
maximization problem under centralization is given by
max
pC1,c,p
C
h,c
ΠCc (38)
subject to
2pC1,c
(
1
6
− 3(p
C
1,c−p
C
h,c)
2τ
)
1− δ ≥ p
C
h,c −
2τ
9
+
δpiN1,c
1− δ (39)
and
2pCh,c
(
1
3
− 3(p
C
h,c
−pC1,c)
2τ
)
1− δ ≥ p
C
1,c −
τ
9
+
δpiNh,c
1− δ (40)
if a deviating firm covers the whole market.22 If it does not, the respective incentive
constraints change to
2pC1,c
(
1
6
− 3(p
C
1,c−p
C
h,c)
2τ
)
1− δ ≥
(
9pCh,c + τ
)2
108τ
+
δpiN1,c
1− δ (41)
and
2pCh,c
(
1
3
− 3(p
C
h,c
−pC1,c)
2τ
)
1− δ ≥
(
9pC1,c + 2τ
)2
108τ
+
δpiNh,c
1− δ . (42)
According to the Weierstrass Theorem, a solution to the maximization problem
20Note that δ¯i,d ⋚ 1/2⇔ τ R τˆ .
21Due to the complexities of the non-linear optimization problem in the case of centralized price
setting, we cannot derive the explicit expressions for the adjusted collusive prices.
22As the numerical simulations suggest and in line with the insights from the decentralization case,
this is true for relatively low values of τ and higher values of δ.
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exists if (i) ΠCc is continuous on its domain and (ii) if the (non-empty) set of inequal-
ity constraints is compact (i.e. closed and bounded).23 Clearly, (i) is satisfied. To
check condition (ii), we need to verify that the relevant inequalities can be satisfied
at the same time. This, however, is always the case as any incentive constraint is
satisfied if pC1,c = p
N
1,c and p
C
h,c = p
N
h,c. Hence, the lowest collusive profit is equal to
the competitive profit.
As piCi,d(δ) ≤ piNh,c ⇔ δ ≤ 7/79, δ∗ exists. Moreover, we know from Proposition 1
that piCh,c < pi
C
h,d if δ is large. Hence, δ
∗∗ exists. 
23See, e.g., Sundaram (1996), chapter 3.
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